From the archiveCase study · Mar 20206 min read
Dash for cash: Treasury yields up 64bp in a crash
In March 2020 investors sold even US Treasuries to raise cash: the 10-year yield rose about 64bp in seven trading days as stocks fell, until the Fed pledged on 23 March to buy whatever was needed and flooded the world with dollars.
Between 9 and 18 March 2020 the 10-year Treasury yield rose about 64 while stocks kept falling: investors were selling the world’s safest asset to raise cash.
Funds and foreign investors sold, leveraged basis trades unwound and dealers ran out of room. Treasuries failed as a hedge just when portfolios needed one most.
On 23 March the Fed pledged to buy whatever was needed, beside dollar swap lines and FIMA repo. The lesson still holds: even the safest market needs a buyer of last resort.
The trader’s angle
The deepest bond market in the world can seize up when everyone needs cash at once, and leverage in Treasuries makes the central bank the buyer of last resort.
10-year Treasury yield, 9–18 Mar
+64bp
upafter a record low on 9 MarIt touched a record low of about 0.32% on 9 March, then rose while equities kept falling: the opposite of a normal flight to safety.
Foreign net sales of Treasuries
about $420bn
downMarch 2020Official and private investors combined, by a Fed staff estimate that adds trades the monthly TIC data miss; TIC data alone show less. The FIMA repo facility later let central banks borrow dollars against Treasuries instead of selling them.
Fed Treasury purchases, peak week
about $350bn
uplate March 2020Plus about $180bn of agency MBS in its peak week. The pace was cut back as conditions improved.
Dollar swap line borrowing, peak
$449bn
upweek of 27 May 2020From effectively nothing in mid-March. Most was drawn by the ECB and the Bank of Japan to ease a global dollar shortage.
A Treasury and the bonds it can be settled with should trade at almost the same price. When the cash bond is slightly cheaper, hedge funds buy it and sell the future, pocketing the small gap as the two prices converge. That is the .
The gap is tiny, so funds borrow heavily in the market, pledging the bonds as , to make it worthwhile. The trade is low-risk only while funding is easy and prices behave.
If volatility jumps, futures exchanges demand more margin and repo lenders demand more collateral. can then force funds to sell the cash bonds, into a market where everyone else is selling too.
What happened
As Covid-19 spread in early March 2020, investors first did the textbook thing and bought : on Monday 9 March the 10-year touched a record low of about 0.32%. Then the market turned. Over the next seven trading days the 10-year yield rose about 64bp while stocks kept falling. Investors weren’t buying the ; they were selling it, because it was the easiest asset to turn into cash.
On Sunday 15 March the Fed cut its by a full point, to 0–0.25%. It also promised to buy at least $500bn of Treasuries and $200bn of , but the selling went on. On Monday 23 March the Fed dropped the limits: it would buy whatever quantity of Treasuries and was needed to keep those markets working, starting with about $75bn of Treasuries a day that week.
Why it happened
Everyone needed dollars at the same moment. Research published by the BIS identifies three groups selling in a hurry: bond mutual funds, foreign official investors such as central banks, and hedge funds. Foreign investors, official and private, sold a net of about $420bn of Treasuries in March, by one Fed staff estimate.
The hedge funds were unwinding the . As volatility spiked, futures margins rose and funding became harder to roll over, so leveraged funds sold the cash bonds; hedge funds’ Treasury exposure fell by more than $200bn during March. Research at the US Office of Financial Research concluded the unwind was more a result of the stress than its root cause, but it added to the selling.
The sales landed on dealers, the banks that stand between buyers and sellers. Their balance sheets, limited by capital rules, couldn’t absorb the flood. When the middlemen are full, even the deepest market stops working.
How it ripples through markets
How a dash for cash broke the safe haven
- 1
Everyone needs cash at once
upUS dollarAs Covid-19 spreads, funds, foreign central banks and leveraged traders race to raise dollars, and the scramble lifts the dollar.
- 2
The safest asset is sold first
up10y Treasury yieldTreasuries are the easiest thing to sell, and the selling pushes their prices down: the 10-year yield rises about 64bp in seven trading days.
- 3
Basis trades unwind
As volatility spikes, higher margins and harder repo funding force leveraged funds to sell cash bonds, adding to the selling.
- 4
Dealers fill up
Balance sheets limited by capital rules can’t absorb the flood, and liquidity dries up.
- 5
The Fed becomes buyer of last resort
upFed balance sheet23 March: purchases in whatever amounts are needed, while swap lines and FIMA repo supply dollars abroad.
- 6
Markets heal
down10y Treasury yieldWith the Fed absorbing the forced selling, stocks bottom on 23 March, and the 10-year yield hits a record closing low of about 0.5% on 4 August.
Why it mattered for traders
The standard hedge failed. A portfolio of stocks and Treasuries is meant to cushion itself in a crash, but for about two weeks in mid-March both fell together. was the amplifier: the BIS described forced selling of Treasuries by investors who had borrowed to exploit tiny price gaps, a margin spiral of the kind more usually seen in riskier markets.
It was also a global dollar squeeze, and the dollar rose as foreign borrowers scrambled for it. The Fed answered through the plumbing. Its swap lines lend dollars to other central banks against their own currencies, easing strains in dollar funding abroad.
On 15 March it cut the cost of its standing lines with five major central banks by 25bp. On 19 March it opened lines with nine more: up to $60bn each for six of them and $30bn each for Denmark, Norway and New Zealand. On 31 March it launched the FIMA repo facility, letting foreign central banks borrow dollars overnight against their Treasuries instead of selling them into a fragile market.
What happened next
The backstop worked. Weekly Fed purchases peaked in late March at about $350bn of Treasuries and $180bn of agency MBS, then slowed as conditions improved. The S&P 500 hit its low on 23 March, nearly 34% below its 19 February record, and was back at a record by 18 August. The 10-year yield, freed from forced selling, fell to a record closing low of about 0.5% on 4 August.
Swap-line borrowing peaked at $449bn in late May, mostly by the ECB and the Bank of Japan, and the FIMA facility was made permanent in July 2021. The leverage hasn’t gone away: Fed researchers have kept tracking hedge funds’ Treasury futures and repo positions in the years since. A safe asset is only as safe as the market’s capacity to absorb sales.
Academy lessons for this story
- R8Curve trades, carry and roll-downSet up a trade on the gap between short and long yields, size it so only the gap matters, and work out what a bond earns while you wait.
- F9Fiscal policy, debt and bond supplyExplain deficits and debt, project debt against GDP, and say why heavy government borrowing pushes up long-term interest rates.
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Sources
- Federal Reserve Board — Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement, 15 March 2020
- Federal Reserve Board — Federal Reserve announces extensive new measures to support the economy, 23 March 2020
- Federal Reserve Board — Federal Reserve announces the establishment of temporary U.S. dollar liquidity arrangements with other central banks, 19 March 2020
- Federal Reserve Board — Federal Reserve announces establishment of a temporary FIMA Repo Facility, 31 March 2020
- Bank for International Settlements — The Treasury market in spring 2020 and the response of the Federal Reserve (Working Paper 966)
- Bank for International Settlements — Leverage and margin spirals in fixed income markets during the Covid-19 crisis (BIS Bulletin 2)
- Office of Financial Research — Hedge Funds and the Treasury Cash-Futures Disconnect
- Federal Reserve Board (FEDS Notes) — Foreign demand for U.S. Treasury securities during the pandemic
An original summary written from the sources above. Figures are rounded; follow the links for the full record.
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